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Abstract—Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have re-
cently emerged as a significant security challenge for Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPSs) due to APTs’ stealthy, dynamic
and adaptive nature. The proactive dynamic defense pro-
vides a strategic and holistic security mechanism to increase
costs of attacks and mitigate risks. This work proposes a dy-
namic game framework to model the long-term interaction
between the stealthy attacker and the proactive defender.
The stealthy and deceptive behaviors are captured by
the multistage game of incomplete information, where
each player has his own private information unknown
to the other. Both players act strategically according to
their beliefs which are formed by multistage observation
and learning. The solution concept of Perfect Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) provides a useful prediction
of both players’ policies because no players benefit from
unilateral deviations from the equilibrium. We propose
an iterative algorithm to compute the PBNE and use
Tennessee Eastman process as a benchmark case study. Our
numerical experiment corroborates the analytical results
and provides further insights into the design of proactive
defense-in-depth strategies.
Index Terms—Advanced persistent threats, defense in
depth, proactive defense, industrial control system secu-
rity, cyber deception, multistage Bayesian game, perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, Tennessee Eastman process
I. INTRODUCTION
THE recent growth of automation, Internet of Things(IoT), and cloud services has accelerated the pace
of integrating computing and communication function-
alities with components in the physical world, which
constitutes Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). The cyber
integration increases the operation efficiency of the
physical system, yet also creates a number of security
vulnerabilities. First, connectivity and openness have
expanded the attack surface and provided adversarial
users with more access points. For example, an attacker
can compromise components connected to the targeted
assets through cyber or physical networks with the goal
of data breaches and physical damages. Second, the
component heterogeneity, the functionality complexity,
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and the large scale of CPSs have also created zero-day
vulnerabilities and made the defense more costly.
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are one of the
emerging threats for CPSs. Unlike the automated probes
and amateurish hackers, APTs have specific targets and
conduct thorough research to expose the system archi-
tecture, valuable assets, and even defense strategies so
that attackers can tailor their strategies and invalidate the
cryptography, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems.
APTs are also deceptive and can stealthily stay in the
system for a long time. One recent example of APTs is
Stuxnet, which has aimed to compromise Iran’s nuclear
system by changing the centrifuges’ rotor speed once
a month for years. Meanwhile, Stuxnet has used replay
attacks to disguise the attack as the equipment aging
[1]. Proactive defense in depth is a useful class of
strategies to defend against such sophisticated attacks.
The proactive defense strategically designs a security
mechanism prior to an attack to increase the cost of
attacks and mitigate potential losses. The defense in
depth, on the other hand, employs a holistic approach
to protect assets across the cyber-physical layers, taking
into account interconnections and interdependencies of
these layers. Hence the design of proactive defense-in-
depth strategies provides efficient cross-layer protection
that deters attacks and reduces cybersecurity risks.
To develop a formal design paradigm, we leverage
game-theoretic methods to capture constraints on the de-
fense, consequences of attacks, and attackers’ incentives
quantitatively. In particular, we propose a multistage
game framework to model the long-term interaction and
stealthiness of APTs. We divide the entire life cycle of
APTs into multiple stages where at each stage, both play-
ers take actions, make observations, and then move to the
next stage. Fig. 1 illustrates the multistage structure of a
common APT kill chain [2]. During the reconnaissance
phase, the threat actor probes the system and obtains
intelligence from open-source or inside information. The
reconnaissance phase identifies vulnerable targets and
increases the success of the initial compromise. After
APTs obtain the private key and establish a foothold,
they escalate privilege, propagate laterally in the cyber
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Fig. 1: The multistage structure of APT kill chain is composed of reconnaissance, initial compromise, privilege escalation, lateral
movement, and mission execution.
network, and finally either access confidential informa-
tion or inflict physical damages. The chain structure of
APTs can be mapped into a game of multiple stages,
where each stage describes a local interaction between
the attacker and the defender where the outcome leads
to the next stage of interactions. The goal of the APT is
to reach the targeted physical assets while the defender
aims to take actions at multiple stages of the kill chain
to thwart the attack or reduce its impacts.
One key challenge of the game-theoretic framework
is to capture the stealthy and deceptive behaviors in
the network. In this work, we use the multistage game
of incomplete information [3] to model the information
asymmetry between players. To this end, we introduce
the notion of types to characterize the private information
of the players in the game. On one hand, the type
of users, legitimate or adversarial, is unknown to the
defender because of the stealthy nature of APTs. On
the other hand, the level configuration of the network,
which can be low or high, is unknown to the users or
the attackers when the network administrator hides or
obfuscates her type via defensive deception techniques
such as the moving target defense and the honeypot
deployment. Players’ types determine their utilities and
affect their behaviors. Thus, each player observes and
analyzes behaviors of the other player at each stage to
form a belief of the other’s type. When observations
are available during their persistent interactions, players
continuously update their beliefs via the Bayesian rule.
Both players act strategically according to their beliefs
to maximize their utilities. The PBNE provides a useful
prediction of their policies at every stage for each type
since no players benefit from unilateral deviations at the
equilibrium. The computation of PBNE is challenging
due to the coupling between the forward belief update
and the backward policy computation. We first formulate
a mathematical programming problem to compute the
equilibrium policy pair under a given belief for a one-
stage Bayesian game. Then, we extend this approach
to compute the equilibrium policy pair under a given
sequence of beliefs for multistage Bayesian games by
constructing a sequence of nested mathematical pro-
gramming problems. Finally, we combine these pro-
grams with the Bayesian update and propose an efficient
algorithm to compute the PBNE.
The proposed modeling and computational methods
are shown to be capable of hardening the security of a
broad class of industrial SCADA systems. This work
leverages the Tennessee Eastman (TE) process as a
case study of proactive defenses against APTs that can
infiltrate into the cyber network through spoofing emails,
then escalate privileges, tamper the sensor reading, and
decrease the operational efficiency of the TE process
without triggering the alarm. The dynamic games ap-
proach offers a quantitative way to assess the risks and
provides a systematic and computational mechanism to
develop proactive and strategic defenses across multiple
cyber-physical stages of the operations. First, we observe
that defense at the final stage is usually too late to be
effective when APTs have been well-prepared and ready
to attack. We need to take precautions and proactive
responses in the cyber stages when the attack remains
“under the radar” so that the attacker becomes less dom-
inant when they reach the final stage. Second, the online
learning capability of the defender plays an important
role in detecting the adversarial deception and tilting the
information asymmetry. It increases the probability of
identifying the hidden information from the observable
behaviors, threatens the stealthy attacker to take more
conservative actions, and hence reduces the attack loss.
Third, defensive deception techniques are shown to be
effective to increase the uncertainties of the attacks and
their learning costs and hence reduce the probability of
successful attacks.
A. Related Work
1) APT Defense and Security Games: Detecting
APTs is challenging. US companies in 2018 have taken
an average of 197 and 69 days, respectively, to detect and
3contain a data breach [4]. Previous works have focused
on detecting APTs with the network traffic analysis [5],
[6], white-listing [7], and a context-based framework [8].
As an alternative to these detection methods, security
game models [9], [10], [11] have provided quantitative
risk management frameworks that allow the system to
prepare for attacks proactively. FlipIt game [12] models
the key leakage under APTs as a private takeover be-
tween the system operator and the attacker. The FlipIt
focuses on the optimal timing for resource allocations,
however, oversimplifies the interaction of defenders with
different types of users/attackers at different yet inter-
dependent stages. Our game framework models hetero-
geneous adversarial and defensive behaviors at multiple
stages, which is capable of predicting attack moves and
losses based on the equilibrium analysis. Other works
extend FlipIt game for the APT defense by integrating
FlipIt with other components such as the signaling game
to defend cloud service against APT [13], another player
to model the insider threats [14], and a system of
multiple nodes under limited resources [15].
2) Cyber Deceptions and Incomplete Information
Games: Cyber deception is an emerging research area.
Games of incomplete information are natural frame-
works to model the uncertainty and misinformation
introduced by cyber deceptions. For example, strategic
attackers in [16] manipulate the attack data to mislead
the defender in finitely repeated security games.
To combat adversarial deceptions where the deceiver
is the attacker, a defender can also initiate defensive de-
ception techniques [17] such as perturbations via external
noises, obfuscations via revealing useless information,
or honeypot deployments. A honeypot which appears
to contain valuable information can lure attackers into
isolation and surveillance. A system can also disguise a
real asset as a honeypot to evade attacks [18].
3) Preliminary Version: The preliminary version of
this work [19] has considered a dynamic game with one-
sided incomplete information where attackers disguise as
legitimate users. This work extends the framework to a
two-sided incomplete information structure where prim-
itive systems can also disguise as sophisticated systems.
The new framework enables us to jointly investigate
deceptions adopted by both attackers and defenders,
and strategically design defensive deceptions to counter
adversarial ones. We also develop new methodologies
to address the challenge of the coupled belief update
in a generalize setting without the previous assumption
of the beta-binomial conjugate pair. In the case study,
we investigate heterogeneous actions and cyber stages
such as web phishing and privilege escalation, whose
utilities are no longer negligible. Moreover, we leverage
the TE process with new performance metric and diverse
attack models to validate the proposed proactive defense-
in-depth strategies and the efficacy of learning and
defensive deceptions.
B. Notations
Common notations used in this paper are described
as follows. For any finite set A , the cardinality of
the set is |A |. Notation ‘′’ is the transpose of a vec-
tor and lm := [1,1, · · · ,1]′ ∈ Rm is a column vector
of 1 with dimension m. Define 4(A ) := { f : A 7→
R+|∑a∈A f (a) = 1} and the simplex set of dimension m
as Γm := {p ∈Rm|p′lm = 1, p≥ 0} where p≥ 0 means
that every element of vector p is greater than 0. The
indicator function 1{x=y} equals one if x = y, and zero
if x 6= y. The superscript k represents stage k and the
subscript i represents for player i.
C. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the multistage game with incomplete
information and three equilibrium solution concepts are
defined in Section III. To compute these equilibrium,
we construct constrained optimization problems and an
iterative algorithm in Section IV. A case study of TE
process under APTs is presented in Section V with
results in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. DYNAMIC GAME MODELLING OF APT ATTACKS
In this section, we introduce the multistage Bayesian
game to model the dynamic interaction between the user
P2 (pronoun ‘he’) and the system defender P1 (pronoun
‘she’) under incomplete information.
A. Games of Incomplete Information
The stealthy, persistent, and deceptive features of
APTs result in incomplete information to the defender.
APT attackers can disguise their subversive actions as
legitimate behaviors so that the defender cannot dis-
tinguish an APT attacker from a legitimate user. A
proactive defender can also apply defensive deceptions
and introduce incomplete information to the attacker.
The Bayesian game [3] describes this double-sided
incomplete information where the private information
associated with Pi is denoted by a discrete random
variable θˆi that has a finite support set Θi. The true
value or the realized value of the random variable θˆi
is called Pi’s type θi. Players knows their types yet not
others’ types. In our application, a user’s type θ2 is either
adversarial θ b2 or legitimate θ
g
2 . The defender’s type θ1
can either be sophisticated θH1 or primitive θ
L
1 . However,
both players’ types can also be non-binary, e.g., θ1 dis-
tinguishes systems with different kinds of vulnerabilities
and θ2 distinguishes attackers with different targets.
4B. Multistage Transition
Since APTs have specific targets at the final stage,
going back to previous stages does not bring benefits.
Therefore, the multistage attack graph has a tree structure
without jumps or loops as shown in Fig. 1. We use a
multistage game with a finite horizon K to model the
attack graph of APTs. At each stage k ∈ {0,1, · · · ,K},
Pi takes an action aki ∈ A ki from a finite and discrete
set A ki . We define m
k
i := |A ki | as the number of actions
Pi can take at stage k and specify the discrete action
set as A ki := {a1,ki , · · · ,a
mki ,k
i }. The action aki represents
the observable behavior associated with Pi, e.g., ‘sensor
access’ for the user and ‘sensor monitoring’ for the
defender. Since the other player Pj of different types θ j
can take the same action akj, Pi cannot directly identify
the true type of Pj with the observation of action akj.
In addition, the same action taken by Pi of different
types can lead to different consequences. For example, a
sensor access from a legitimate user benefits the system
yet the access from a pernicious user inflicts a loss.
Besides, the loss is slight to a sophisticated system θH1
but considerable to a primitive system θL1 . Thus, in
Section II-D, the stage utilities are taken to be dependent
on both players’ actions as well as their types.
Both players’ actions up to stage k constitute
the history hk = {a01, · · · ,ak−11 ,a02, · · · ,ak−12 } ∈ H k :=
∏2i=1∏
k−1
k¯=0A
k¯
i . Given history h
k at the current stage
k, players at stage k + 1 obtain an updated history
hk+1 = hk ∪ {ak1,ak2} after the observation ak1,ak2. At
each stage k, we further define a state xk ∈X k as the
smallest set of quantities that summarize information
about actions in previous stages so that the initial state
x0 ∈X 0 and the history at stage k uniquely determine
xk through a known state transition function f k, i.e.,
xk+1 = f k(xk,ak1,a
k
2),∀k∈{0,1, · · · ,K−1}. The state can
represent the location of the user in the attack graph, and
also other quantities such as users’ privilege levels.
C. Behavioral Strategy and Belief Update
A behavioral strategy σ ki ∈ Σki : I ki 7→ 4(A ki ) maps
Pi’s information set I ki at stage k to a probability
distribution over the action space A ki . The action is a
realization of the behavioral strategy, or equivalently, a
sample drawn from the probability distribution σ ki (·|Iki ).
With a slight abuse of notation, we denote σ ki (aki |Iki )
as the probability of Pi taking action aki ∈ A ki given
the available information Iki ∈I ki . Note that the values
of the other player’s type θ j and action akj, which are
not observable for Pi at stage k, do not affect Pi’s
behavior strategy σ ki , i.e., Pr(aki |akj,θ j, Iki ) = σ ki (aki |Iki ).
Thus, σ k1 and σ
k
2 are conditional independent, i.e.,
Pr(aki ,a
k
j|Iki , Ikj ) = σ ki (aki |Iki )σ kj (akj|Ikj ).
Since the other player’s type is of private information,
Pi forms a belief bki : I
k
i 7→ 4(Θ j), j 6= i, on Pj’s type
using the available information I ki . Likewise, given
information Iki ∈ I ki at stage k, Pi believes with a
probability bki (θ j|Iki ) that Pj is of type θ j ∈ Θ j. At the
initial stage k = 0, the only information available is the
player’s type realization, i.e., I0i = {θi}. We assume that
Pi has a prior belief distribution b0i (·|θi) based on the
past experiences with the other player. If no previous
experiences are available to Pi, Pi can take the uniform
distribution as an unbiased prior belief.
The information structure plays a vital role in decision
making and the belief update. We present three different
information structures I ki at stage 0 < k≤K as follows.
1) Perfect Recall with Real-time Observations: If we
assume that the system has a perfect recall I ki =H
k×
Θi, then players can update their beliefs according to the
Bayesian rule:
bk+1i (θ j|hk ∪{aki ,akj},θi) =
σ ki (aki |hk,θi)σ kj (akj|hk,θ j)bki (θ j|hk,θi)
∑θ¯ j∈Θ j σ
k
i (a
k
i |hk,θi)σ kj (akj|hk, θ¯ j)bki (θ¯ j|hk,θi)
.
(1)
Here, Pi updates the belief bki based on the obser-
vation of the action aki ,a
k
j. When the denominator is
0, the history hk+1 is not reachable from hk, and a
Bayesian update does not apply. In this case, we let
bk+1i (θ j|hk ∪{aki ,akj},θi) := b0i (θ j|θi).
2) Perfect Recall with Delayed Observations: The
deceptive and stealthy characteristics of APTs may cause
a delay τ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,K− 1} in the action observation.
At stage k≤ τ , there is no new information available for
Pi, i.e., h¯k = /0, thus bk+1i (θ j|h¯k+1,θi) = b0i (θ j|θi),∀θi ∈
Θi,∀θ j ∈ Θ j. At stage τ < k ≤ K, we have h¯k =
{a01, · · · ,ak−1−τ1 ,a02, · · · ,ak−1−τ2 } and the Bayesian belief
update is given as follows:
bk+1i (θ j|h¯k ∪{ak−τi ,ak−τj },θi) =
σ k−τi (a
k−τ
i |h¯k,θi)σ k−τj (ak−τj |h¯k,θ j)bki (θ j|h¯k,θi)
∑θ¯ j σ
k−τ
i (a
k−τ
i |h¯k,θi)σ k−τj (ak−τj |h¯k, θ¯ j)bki (θ¯ j|h¯k,θi)
.
3) Markov Belief: When players do not have
perfect recalls, the information set is taken to
be I ki = X
k × Θi. With the Markov property
that Pr(xk+1|θ j,xk, · · · ,x1,x0,θi) = Pr(xk+1|θ j,xk,θi), the
Bayesian update between two consequent states is
bk+1i (θ j|xk+1,θi) =
Pr(xk+1|θ j,xk,θi)bki (θ j|xk,θi)
∑θ¯ j∈Θ j Pr(x
k+1|θ¯ j,xk,θi)bki (θ¯ j|xk,θi)
.
(2)
With the conditional independence of σ k1 and σ
k
2 ,
Pr(xk+1|θ j,xk,θi)
= ∑
{ak1,ak2}∈A x
k+1
xk
σ k1 (a
k
1|xk,θ1)σ k2 (ak2|xk,θ2), (3)
5where the set A x
k+1
xk := {ak1 ∈ A k1 ,ak2 ∈ A k2 |xk+1 =
f k(xk,ak1,a
k
2)} contains the action pairs that change the
system state from xk to xk+1. Equation (3) shows that
the Bayesian update in (2) can be obtained from (1) by
clustering all the action pairs in the set A x
k+1
xk . Thus,
the Markov belief update (2) can also be regarded as an
approximation of (1) using action aggregations. Unlike
the history set H k, the dimension of the state set |X k|
does not grow with the number of stages. Hence, the
Markov approximation significantly reduces the memory
and computational complexity.
The following sections adopt the Markov belief
update in (2). For every given state xk ∈ X k, we
can use a type-dependent probability vector Qki (θi) :=
[σ ki (a
i,k
i |xk,θi), · · · ,σ ki (a
mki ,k
i |xk,θi)]′ ∈ Γm
k
i to represent
the behavioral strategy σ ki (·|xk,θi).
D. Stage and Cumulative Utility
At each stage k, Pi’s stage utility J¯ki :
X k × A k1 × A k2 × θ1 × θ2 × R 7→ R depends on
both players’ types and actions, the current state
xk ∈ X k, and an external noise wki ∈ R with a
known probability density function ϖki . The noise
term models unknown or uncontrolled factors that
can affect the value of the stage utility. The existence
of the external noise makes it impossible for Pi,
after reaching stage k + 1, to infer the value of the
other player’s type θ j based on the knowledge of
the input parameters xk,ak1,a
k
2,θi, together with the
output of the utility function J¯ki at stage k. Denote
the expected stage utility as Jki (x
k,ak1,a
k
2,θ1,θ2) :=
Ewki∼ϖki J¯
k
i (x
k,ak1,a
k
2,θ1,θ2,w
k
i ),∀xk,ak1,ak2,θ1,θ2. Since
two players’ action sets are discrete, for each state
xk ∈ X k, Jki can be represented by a type-related
bi-matrix denoted by (Jk1(θ1,θ2),J
k
2(θ1,θ2)), where
the lth ∈ [1,mk1] row and the nth ∈ [1,mk2] column
of Jki (θ1,θ2) ∈ Rm
k
1×mk2 ,∀k ∈ {0, · · · ,K}, is given by
Jki (x
k,al,k1 ,a
n,k
2 ,θ1,θ2).
Given the type θi ∈Θi, the initial state xk0 ∈X k0 , and
both players’ strategies σ k0:Ki := [σ
k
i (a
k
i |xk,θi)]k=k0,··· ,K ∈
∏Kk=k0 Σ
k
i from stage k0 to K, we can determine the
expected cumulative utility Uk0:Ki for Pi, i ∈ {1,2}, by
taking expectations over the mixed-strategy distributions
and the Pi’s belief on Pj’s type, i.e.,
Uk0:Ki (σ
k0:K
i ,σ
k0:K
j ,x
k0 ,θi)
:=
K
∑
k=k0
Eθ j∼bki ,aki∼σ ki ,akj∼σkj [J
k
i (x
k,ak1,a
k
2,θ1,θ2)]
=
K
∑
k=k0
∑
θ j∈Θ j
bki (θ j|xk,θi) ∑
aki ∈A ki
σ ki (a
k
i |xk,θi)·
∑
akj∈A kj
σ kj (a
k
j|xk,θ j)Jki (xk,ak1,ak2,θ1,θ2), j 6= i.
(4)
III. PBNE AND DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
The APT attacker and the defender use the Bayesian
update to reduce their uncertainties on the other player’s
type. Since their actions affect the belief update, both
players at each stage should optimize their expected cu-
mulative utilities concerning the updated beliefs, which
leads to the solution concept of PBNE in Definition 1.
Definition 1: Consider the two-person K-stage game
with a double-sided incomplete information, a sequence
of beliefs bki ,∀k ∈ {0, · · · ,K}, an expected cumulative
utility U0:Ki in (4), and a given scalar ε ≥ 0. A se-
quence of strategies σ∗,0:Ki ∈∏Kk=0Σki is called ε-dynamic
Bayesian Nash equilibrium for player i if condition (C2)
is satisfied. If condition (C1) is also satisfied, σ∗,0:Ki is
further called ε-perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
(C1): Belief consistency: under the strategy pair
(σ∗,0:K1 ,σ
∗,0:K
2 ), each player’s belief b
k
i at each
stage k = 0, · · · ,K satisfies (2).
(C2): Sequential rationality: for all given initial state
xk0 ∈X k0 at every initial stage k0 ∈ {0, · · · ,K},
Uk0:K1 (σ
∗,k0:K
1 ,σ
∗,k0:K
2 ,x
k0 ,θ1)+ ε ≥
Uk:K1 (σ
k0:K
1 ,σ
∗,k0:K
2 ,x
k0 ,θ1),∀σ k0:K1 ∈
K
∏
k=0
Σk1;
Uk0:K2 (σ
∗,k0:K
1 ,σ
∗,k0:K
2 ,x
k0 ,θ2)+ ε ≥
Uk:K2 (σ
∗,k0:K
1 ,σ
k0:K
2 ,x
k0 ,θ2),∀σ k0:K2 ∈
K
∏
k=0
Σk2.
(5)
When ε = 0, the two ε-equilibria are called Dy-
namic Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (DBNE) and Perfect
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE), respectively.
PBNE is a refinement of DBNE with the requirement
of the belief consistency property. When the horizon
K = 0, the multistage game of incomplete information
defined in Section II degenerates to a one-stage (static)
Bayesian game with the one-stage belief pairs (bK1 ,b
K
2 )
and the solution concept of DBNE/PBNE degenerates
to the Static Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (SBNE) in
Definition 2.
The sequential rationality property in (5) guarantees
that unilateral deviations from the equilibrium at any
6states do not benefit the deviating player. Thus, the equi-
librium strategy can be a reasonable prediction of both
players’ multistage behaviors. DBNE strategies have the
property of strongly time consistency (STC) because (5)
holds for any possible initial states, even for states that
are not on the equilibrium path, i.e., those states would
not be visited under DBNE strategies. The STC property
makes DBNE adapt to unexpected changes since it can
tolerate trembling hand errors. Solutions obtained by
dynamic programming naturally satisfy STC. Hence, in
the following, we introduce algorithms based on dynamic
programming techniques.
Define the value function V k0i (x
k0 ,θi) :=
Uk0:Ki (σ
∗,k0:K
1 ,σ
∗,k0:K
2 ,x
k0 ,θi) as the utility-to-go
from any initial stage k0 ∈ {0, · · · ,K} under the DBNE
strategy pair (σ∗,k0:K1 ,σ
∗,k0:K
2 ). Then, at the final stage
K, the value function for player i ∈ {1,2} with type θi
at state xK is
V Ki (x
K ,θi) = sup
σKi ∈ΣKi
Eθ j∼bKi ,aKi ∼σKi ,aKj ∼σ∗,Kj
JKi (x
K ,aK1 ,a
K
2 ,θ1,θ2).
(6)
For each given state xK at the final stage K, we can also
represent (6) in a compact matrix form with QKi , the
vector form of the behavioral strategy, i.e.,
V Ki (x
K ,θi) = Eθ j∼bKi [Q
∗,K
1 (θ1)
′JKi (θ1,θ2)Q
∗,K
2 (θ2)].
For any feasible sequence of belief pairs
(bk1,b
k
2),k = 0, · · · ,K−1, we have the following
recursive system equations for P1 and P2 to find the
equilibrium strategy pairs (σ∗,k1 ,σ
∗,k
2 ) backwardly
from stage K − 1 to the initial stage 0, i.e.,
∀k ∈ {0, · · · ,K−1},∀i, j ∈ {1,2}, j 6= i,
V ki (x
k,θi) = sup
σ ki ∈Σki
Eθ j∼bki ,aki∼σ ki ,akj∼σ∗,kj
[V k+1i ( f
k(xk,ak1,a
k
2),θi)+ J
k
i (x
k,ak1,a
k
2,θ1,θ2)].
(7)
If we assume a virtual termination value
V K+1i ( f
K(xK ,aK1 ,a
K
2 ),θi) ≡ 0, we can obtain (6)
by letting stage k = K in (7). The second term in (7)
represents the immediate stage utility and the first term
represents the expected utility under the future state
xk+1 = f k(xk,ak1,a
k
2),k ∈ {0, · · · ,K−1}. Since aki affects
both terms, players should adopt a long-term perspective
and avoid myopic behaviors to balance between the
immediate utility and the expected future utility.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL ALGORITHMS
In IV-A, we formulate a constrained optimization
problem to compute SBNE and V Ki for the one-stage
game. The SBNE and the optimization problem are
represented in compact matrix forms. In IV-B, we use
the proposed optimization problem as building blocks
to compute DBNE and V ki ,∀k ∈ {0,K−1}. Finally, we
propose an iterative algorithm to solve for the PBNE.
Efficient algorithms to compute PBNE lay a solid foun-
dation to quantify the risk of cyber-physical attacks and
guide the design of proactive defense-in-depth strategies.
A. One-Stage Bayesian Game and SBNE
Since both players’ actions at stage k = K only affect
the immediate utility JKi and there is no future state
transition, we can treat the final-stage game at each state
xK ∈X K as an equivalent one-stage Bayesian game with
the belief bKi and obtain the solution concept of SBNE.
Definition 2: A pair of mixed-strategies (Q∗,K1 (θ1) ∈
ΓmK1 ,Q∗,K2 (θ2) ∈ Γm
K
2 ) is said to constitute a Static
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (SBNE) under the given
belief pair (bK1 ,b
K
2 ) and the state x
K ∈ X K , if ∀θ1 ∈
Θ1,θ2 ∈Θ2,∀QK1 (θ1) ∈ Γm
K
1 ,∀QK2 (θ2) ∈ Γm
K
2 ,
Eθ2∼bk1 [Q
∗,K
1 (θ1)
′JK1 (θ1,θ2)Q
∗,K
2 (θ2)]≥
Eθ2∼bk1 [Q
K
1 (θ1)
′JK1 (θ1,θ2)Q
∗,K
2 (θ2)];
Eθ1∼bk2 [Q
∗,K
1 (θ1)
′JK2 (θ1,θ2)Q
∗,K
2 (θ2)]≥
Eθ1∼bk2 [Q
∗,K
1 (θ1)
′JK2 (θ1,θ2)Q
K
2 (θ2)].
(8)
With the type-related policy pair (Q∗,K1 (θ1),Q
∗,K
2 (θ2)),
players have made contingency plans on how to react
to different realized types. In Theorem 1, we propose
a constrained optimization program C K to compute the
SBNE. We suppress the superscript of K without any
ambiguity in one-stage games.
Theorem 1: A strategy pair (Q∗1(θ1) ∈ Γm1 ,Q∗2(θ2) ∈
Γm2) constitutes a SBNE to the one-stage bi-matrix
Bayesian game (J1(θ1,θ2),J2(θ1,θ2)) under a private
type θi ∈ Θi,∀i ∈ {1,2}, and a belief bi,∀i ∈ {1,2}, if
and only if the strategy pair is a solution to C K :
[C K ] : max
Q1,Q2,s1,s2
∑
θ1∈Θ1
α1(θ1)s1(θ1)+ ∑
θ2∈Θ2
α2(θ2)s2(θ2)
+ ∑
θ1∈Θ1
α1(θ1)Eθ2∼b1 [Q1(θ1)
′J1(θ1,θ2)Q2(θ2)]
+ ∑
θ2∈Θ2
α2(θ2)Eθ1∼b2 [Q1(θ1)
′J2(θ1,θ2)Q2(θ2)]
s.t.
(a) Eθ1∼b2 [J
′
2(θ1,θ2)Q1(θ1)]≤−s2(θ2)lm2 ,∀θ2,
(b) Q2(θ2)′lm2 = 1,Q2(θ2)≥ 0,∀θ2,
(c) Eθ2∼b1 [J1(θ1,θ2)Q2(θ2)]≤−s1(θ1)lm1 , ∀θ1,
(d) Q1(θ1)′lm1 = 1,Q1(θ1)≥ 0,∀θ1,
where α1(θ1),α2(θ2) are any strictly positive
and finite numbers, and s1(θ1),s2(θ2) are scalar
variables. The optimal solutions exist and are
achieved at the equality of constraints (a),(c),
i.e., s∗2(θ2) = −V2(θ2),s∗1(θ1) = −V1(θ1), where
7V2(θ2) = Eθ1∼b2 [Q
∗
1(θ1)
′J2(θ1,θ2)Q∗2(θ2)] and
V1(θ1) = Eθ2∼b1 [Q
∗
1(θ1)
′J1(θ1,θ2)Q∗2(θ2)] are the
game values of P2 and P1, respectively.
Proof 1: Proof: The finiteness and discreteness
of the action and the type spaces guarantee the
existence of SBNE in mixed-strategy [20], which
further guarantee that program C K has solutions. To
show the equivalence between the solution to C K and
the SBNE, we first show that every SBNE is a solution
of C K . If (Q∗1(θ1) ∈ Γm1 ,Q∗2(θ2) ∈ Γm2) is a SBNE
pair, then the quadruple Q∗1(θ1),Q
∗
2(θ2),s
∗
2(θ2) =
−Eθ1∼b2 [Q∗1(θ1)′J2(θ1,θ2)Q∗2(θ2)],s∗1(θ1) =
−Eθ2∼b1 [Q∗1(θ1)′J1(θ1,θ2)Q∗2(θ2)],∀θi ∈ Θi,∀i ∈ {1,2},
is feasible because it satisfies constraints
(a),(b),(c),(d). Constraints (a) and (c) imply a
non-positive objective function of C K . Since the value
of the objective function achieved under this quadruple
is 0, this quadruple is also optimal.
Second, we show that Q∗1(θ1),Q
∗
2(θ2),s
∗
2(θ2),s
∗
1(θ1),
the result of C K is a SBNE. The solution of C K
should satisfy all the constraints, i.e., ∀θi ∈Θi,∀Qi(θi)∈
Γmi ,∀i ∈ {1,2},
Q2(θ2)′Eθ1∼b2 [J
′
2(θ1,θ2)Q
∗
1(θ1)]≤−s∗2(θ2),
Q1(θ1)′Eθ2∼b1 [J1(θ1,θ2)Q
∗
2(θ2)]≤−s∗1(θ1).
(9)
In particular, if we pick Q1(θ1) = Q∗1(θ1),Q2(θ2) =
Q∗2(θ2), then
Q∗2(θ2)
′Eθ1∼b2 [J
′
2(θ1,θ2)Q
∗
1(θ1)]≤−s∗2(θ2),
Q∗1(θ1)
′Eθ2∼b1 [J1(θ1,θ2)Q
∗
2(θ2)]≤−s∗1(θ1).
(10)
Combined with the fact that the optimal value is achieved
at 0, the inequality in (10) turns out to be an equal-
ity and equation (9) becomes (8), which shows that
(Q∗1(θ1),Q
∗
2(θ2)) is a SBNE.
Theorem 1 focuses on the double-sided Bayesian
game where each player Pi has a private type θi ∈ Θi.
To accommodate the one-sided Bayesian game where
Pi’s type θ˜i ∈ Θi becomes common knowledge, we can
modify program C K by letting αi(θ˜i) > 0, αi(θi) =
0,∀θi 6= θ˜i, and α j(θ j)> 0,∀θ j ∈Θ j, j 6= i.
B. Multistage Bayesian Game and PBNE
From (7), we can see that at stages k 6=K, each player
optimizes the sum of the immediate utility Jki and the
utility-to-go V ki . Thus, we can replace the original stage
utility JKi in program C
K with V ki + J
k
i in program C
k
to compute DBNE in a multistage Bayesian game.
Theorem 2: Given a sequence of beliefs bki (·|xk,θi) for
each player i∈ {1,2} at each stage k ∈ {0,1, · · · ,K−1},
a strategy pair (σ∗,0:K−11 ,σ
∗,0:K−1
2 ) constitutes a DBNE
of the K-stage Bayesian game under double-sided incom-
plete information with the expected cumulative utility
U0:Ki in (4), if, and only if σ
∗,k
1 (·|xk,θ1),σ∗,k2 (·|xk,θ2),
s∗,k1 (x
k,θ1),s∗,k2 (x
k,θ2) are the optimal solutions to the
following constrained optimization problem C k for each
k ∈ {0,1, · · · ,K−1}:
[C k] : max
σ k1 ,σ
k
2 ,s
k
1,s
k
2
2
∑
i=1
∑
θi∈Θi
αi(θi){ski (xk,θi)+ ∑
θ j∈Θ j
bki (θ j|xk,θi) ∑
ak1∈A k1
σ k1 (a
k
1|xk,θ1) ∑
ak2∈A k2
σ k2 (a
k
2|xk,θ2)
· [Jki (xk,ak1,ak2,θ1,θ2)+V k+1i ( f k(xk,ak1,ak2),θi)]}
s.t.
(a) ∑
θ1∈Θ1
bk2(θ1|xk,θ2) ∑
ak1∈A k1
σ k1 (a
k
1|xk,θ1)·
[Jk2(x
k,ak1,a
k
2,θ1,θ2)+V
k+1
2 ( f
k(xk,ak1,a
k
2),θ2)]
≤−sk2(xk,θ2)lm2 ,∀θ2 ∈Θ2,
(b) ∑
θ2∈Θ2
bk1(θ2|xk,θ1) ∑
ak2∈A k2
σ k2 (a
k
2|xk,θ2)·
[Jk1(x
k,ak1,a
k
2,θ1,θ2)+V
k+1
1 ( f
k(xk,ak1,a
k
2),θ1)]
≤−sk1(xk,θ1)lm1 ,∀θ1 ∈Θ1.
Similarly, α1(θ1),α2(θ2) can be any strictly positive
and finite numbers, and (sk1(θ1),s
k
2(θ2)) is a sequence
of scalar variables. The optimum exists and is achieved
at the equality of constraints (a),(b), i.e., s∗,ki (x
k,θ2) =
−V ki (xk,θi),∀θ2 ∈Θ2.
The proof is similar to the one for Theorem 1. Here,
variables σ ki are shorthand notations for Pi’s strategy,
which can be represented by a finite dimensional vector
Qki of size |A ki | × |X k| × |Θi|. By letting stage k = K
and V K+1i = 0, program C
K for the static Bayesian game
is a special case of C k for the multistage Bayesian game.
We can solve program C k+1 to obtain the DBNE
strategy pair (σ k+11 ,σ
k+1
2 ) and the value of V
k+1
i . Then,
we apply V k+1i in program C
k to obtain a DBNE strategy
pair (σ k1 ,σ
k
2 ) and the value of V
k
i . Thus, for any given se-
quences of type belief pairs bki (·|xk,θi),∀i ∈ {1,2},∀k ∈
{0,1, · · · ,K}, we can solve C k from k = K to k = 0
recursively to obtain the DBNE pair (σ∗,0:K−11 ,σ
∗,0:K−1
2 ).
1) PBNE: To this end, given a sequence of beliefs, we
can obtain the corresponding DBNE via C k in a back-
ward fashion. However, given a sequence of policies,
both players forwardly update their beliefs at each stage
by (2). Thus, we need to find a consistent pair of belief
and policy sequences. As summarized in Algorithm 1,
we iteratively alternate between the forward belief update
and the backward policy computation to find the PBNE.
We resort to ε-PBNE solutions when the existence of
PBNE is not guaranteed.
Algorithm 1 provides a computational approach to find
ε-PBNE with the following procedure. First, both players
initialize their beliefs bki (·|xk,θi) for every state xk at
stage k ∈ {0,1, · · · ,K}, according to their types θi. Then,
they compute the DBNE strategy pair σ∗,0:Ki ,∀i∈ {1,2},
8Algorithm 1: Numerical Solution of ε-PBNE
1 Initialization beliefs bki (·|xk,θi) at each stage
k ∈ {0,1, · · · ,K}, ITERNUM> 0, ε ≥ 0.
2 while the t <ITERNUM do
3 t := t+1;
4 for each xK ∈X K do
5 Compute SBNE strategy σ∗,Ki (·|xK ,θi) and
V Ki (x
K ,θi) via C K .
6 end
7 for k← K−1 to 0 do
8 for each xk ∈X k do
9 Compute DBNE strategy σ∗,ki (·|xk,θi)
and V ki (x
k,θi) via C k.
10 end
11 end
12 for k← 0 to K−1 do
13 Update bki (·|xk,θi) with σ∗,0:K−1i via (2).
14 end
15 if σ∗,0:K−1i ,∀i ∈ {1,2}, satisfy (5) then
16 Terminate
17 end
18 Output ε-PBNE strategy pair (σ∗,0:K−11 ,σ
∗,0:K−1
2 )
and consistent beliefs bki (·|xk,θi),∀k ∈ {0, · · · ,K}.
under the given belief sequence at each stage by solving
program C k from stage K to stage 0 in sequence. Next,
they update their beliefs at each stage according to
the strategy pair σ∗,0:K−1i ,∀i ∈ {1,2}, via the Bayesian
update (2). If the strategy pair σ∗,0:K−1i ,∀i ∈ {1,2},
satisfies (5) under the updated belief, we find the ε-
PBNE and terminate the iteration. Otherwise, we repeat
the backward policy computation in step two and the
forward belief update in step three.
V. CASE STUDY
This section studies an industrial control system under
the APT attack where the attacker stealthily initiates
infection and escalates privileges in the cyber network,
yet launches attacks on the physical plant as shown
in Fig. 2. We use the TE process as a benchmark to
show that attackers can strategically compromise the
SCADA system to decrease the operational efficiency
of a physical plant without triggering the alarm.
As defined in II-A, we adopt the double-sided binary
type space Θ2 = {θ b2 ,θ g2 } and Θ1 = {θH1 ,θL1 } for the
user and the defender, respectively. The sophisticated
system θH1 represents a well-trained defender with a high
security-awareness of the network. The bi-matrices in
Table I, II, and III represent both players’ utilities at
three stages, respectively. In these matrices, P1 is the
row player and P2 is the column player. Each entry of
the matrix corresponds to players’ payoffs under their
action pairs, types, and the state. In particular, the two
red numbers in the parenthesis before the semicolon are
the payoffs of P1,P2, respectively, under type θ b2 , while
the parenthesis in blue after the semicolon presents the
payoff of P1,P2, respectively, under type θ g2 .
A. Initial Stage
As shown in Fig. 1, the intelligence from the re-
connaissance stage supports APTs to gain initial entry
through physical access, web phishing, and social en-
gineering. For example, the Stuxnet virus enters Iran’s
Natanz nuclear facility through a USB from hacked sup-
pliers during the hardware upgrade [1]. The intelligence
related to these hardware vendors plays an essential
role in bridging the air gap and compromising the
nuclear facility. Similarly, knowing internal codes or
jargon can make a spoofing email more credible and
[21] has shown how a social engineer can collect a
series of petty information to manipulate employees for
confidential information and malware installations. Since
91% of cyber attacks start with a phishing email [22],
we consider the web phishing as the initial infection.
A binary state space X 0 = {0,1} summarizes the
reconnaissance outcome. The attacker who conducts
thorough reconnaissance can send phishing emails from
an internal network domain x0 = 1 while ineffectual
reconnaissance results in emails from an external IP
domain, denoted by x0 = 0. To penalize the adversarial
exploitation of the open-source intelligence (OSINT)
data [23], the defender can create avatars (fake personal
profiles) on the social network or the company website.
Both players have three actions at the initial stage,
i.e., A 0i = {0,1,2} where the user can send an email to
an entry-level employee a02 = 0, a manager a
0
2 = 1, or
the avatar a02 = 2. Security training is useful to confront
web phishing. For example, after receiving an email
with unexpected links or attachments, the employee
and the manager should be aware of the potential risk
and request a digital signature from the sender before
clicking the link or opening the attachment. Since em-
ployees’ awareness and alertness diminish over time,
the security training needs to be repeated at reasonable
intervals [21], which can be costly. With a limited
budget, the defender can choose to educate entry-level
employees a01 = 1, manager-level employees a
0
1 = 2, or
no training a01 = 0 to avoid the prohibitive training cost
c0 := c0L ·1{θ1=θL1 }+c
0
H ·1{θ1=θH1 }. The defender of high-
awareness θH1 holds the security training with a higher
frequency, which incurs a higher cost c0H > c
0
L, but is
also more effective in mitigating web phishing, i.e.,
r0H > r
0
L. Let r
0 := r0L · 1{θ1=θL1 }+ r
0
H · 1{θ1=θH1 } and the
utility matrix of the initial infection is given in Table I.
9Fig. 2: The diagram of the cyber state transition and the physical attack via the compromise of the SCADA system. APTs
can damage the normal industrial operation by falsifying controllers’ setpoints, tampering sensor readings, and blocking
communication channels to cause delays in either the control message or the sensing data.
θ b2 ;θ
g
2 Employee Manager Avatars
None (−r02 ,r02);(0,r01) (−r02 ,r02);(0,r01) (0,r0b, f );(0,r0g, f )
Employee (−c0,−r0);(−c0,r01) (−c0,r02);(−c0,r01) (−c0,r0b, f );(−c0,r0g, f )
Manager (−c0,r02);(−c0,r01) (−c0,−r0);(−c0,r01) (−c0,r0b, f );(−c0,r0g, f )
TABLE I: The utility matrix (J01(θ1,θ2),J
0
2(θ1,θ2)). The pay-
offs are in red under type θb2 while in blue under θ
g
2 .
B. Intermediate Stage
The state x1 can be interpreted as the location of the
attacker at the intermediate stage k = 1 where x1 = 0
refers to the honeypot, x1 = 1 refers to the employee’s
computer, and x1 = 2 refers to the manager’s computer.
The user can choose a12 = 1 to escalate his privileges, or
choose a12 = 0, i.e., ‘No Operation Performed (NOP)’.
The defender can choose to either restrict a11 = 1 or
allow a11 = 0 the escalation as shown in Table II. The
θ b2 ;θ
g
2 NOP Escalate
Permit (0,0);(0,0) (−r12 ,r12);(r11 ,r11)
Restrict (0,0);(0,0) (r1,−r1);(−r11 ,−r11)
TABLE II: The utility matrix (J11(θ1,θ2),J
1
2(θ1,θ2)). The pay-
offs are in red under type θb2 while in blue under θ
g
2 .
output state space X 2 = {0,1,2,3} of the transition
f 1 represents four different privilege levels from low to
high, and both the action pair and the state x1 ∈ {0,1,2}
can affect x2. For example, if the user is at the honeypot
state x1 = 0, then he ends up with a level-zero privilege
x2 = 0 whatever actions he takes. If the user reaches the
manager’s computer x1 = 2, he can request for a higher
privilege level and arrive at a more favorable state x2
than from the entry-level employee’s computer x1 = 1.
C. Final Stage
We resort to the simulation model in [24] to quan-
tify monetary losses of the TE process under sensor
compromises. The TE process involves two irreversible
reactions to produce two liquid (liq) products G,H
from four gaseous (g) reactants A,C,D,E as shown in
Fig. 2. The control objective is to maintain a desired
production rate as well as quality while stabilizing the
whole system under the Gaussian noise to avoid violating
safety constraints such as a high reactor pressure, a high
reactor temperature, and a high/low separator/stripper
liquid level.
1) Performance Metric: Previous studies on the se-
curity of the TE process have mostly focused on the
shortest shutdown time (SDT) [25], or a violation of
a setpoint, e.g., the reactor pressure exceeds 3,000
kpa [26]. These attacks trigger the safety alarm and
successfully cause the shutdown of the plant. A few
days of shutdowns would incur a considerable financial
loss. However, the shutdown also reveals the attacker
and leads to an update of defensive strategies. Thus, it
becomes harder for the same kind of attacks to succeed
after the plant recovers from the shutdown.
In our APT scenario, the attacker focuses on decreas-
ing the operation efficiency of the plant, i.e., attackers
aim to stealthily deviate the normal operation state of
the plant without triggering the safety alarm or shutting
down the plant. Then, the plant operates at a non-optimal
state with reduced utilities.
The following economic metrics quantify the utility of
the plant under different states of sensor compromise:
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• Hourly operation cost Co with the unit ($/h) is
taken as the sum of purge costs, product stream
costs, compressor costs, and stripper steam costs.
• Production rate Rp with the unit (m3/h) is the
volume of total products per hour.
• Quality of products Qp with the unit (G mole%),
is the percentage of G among total products.
• PG with the unit ($/m3) is the price of product G.
The utility per hour UT E is computed as follows:
UT E = Rp×Qp×PG−Co. (11)
2) Attack Model: An attack model includes two sep-
arate parts, information and capacity. First, the infor-
mation available to the attacker such as sensor mea-
surements can affect the performance of the attack. For
example, observing the input rate of the raw material
in the TE process is less beneficial for the attacker
than the direct measurements of PG,Rp,Qp,Co that affect
the utility metric in (11). Second, attackers can have
different capacities in accessing and revising controllers
and sensors. An attacker may change the parameters of
the PID controller, directly falsify the controller output,
or indirectly deviate the setpoint by tampering, blocking
or delaying sensor readings.
In this experiment, we assume a sensor data manipu-
lation of sensor XMEAS(40) and XMEAS(17) in loop
8 and loop 13 of TE process, respectively [27]. Sensor
XMEAS(40) measures the composition of component G
and sensor XMEAS(17) measures the stripper underflow.
A higher privilege state x2 ∈ {0,1,2,3} means that the
user can access more sensors for a longer time. Fig.
3 shows the variation of UT E versus the simulation
time under four different privilege states. The attacker
compromises the sensor and generates false readings.
The fake reading can be a constant, denoted by the blue
line, or a double of the real readings, denoted by the red
or green lines. The pink line represents a composition
attack with a limited control time. Initially, the attacker
manages to compromise both sensors by doubling their
readings. After the attacker loses access to XMEAS(40)
at the 6th hour, the system is sufficiently resilient to
recover partially in about 16 hours and achieve the same
level of utility as the single attack in green. When the
attacker also loses access to XMEAS(17) at the 36th
hour, the utility goes back to normal in about 13 hours.
3) Utility Matrix: At the final stage k = 2, the user
chooses to gain access to the sensor a22 = 1 or not a
2
2 =
0, and the defender chooses to monitor a21 = 1 or not
a21 = 0. Define r
2 := r2L · 1{θ1=θL1 }+ r
2
H · 1{θ1=θH1 } as the
monitoring reward for two types of systems where r2H >
r2L > c
2 > 0. As shown in Table III, an implementation
of the monitor system costs c2 yet can bring a payoff of
r2− c2 in detecting sensor compromises.
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Fig. 3: The economic effect of sensor compromise in the TE
process. The black line represents the utility of TE process
under the normal operation while the other four lines represent
the utility of TE process under different kinds of attacks. We
use the time average of these utilities to obtain the normal
operation utility r24 and utilities under four different states of
attacks r21(x
2),∀x2 ∈ {0,1,2,3}, in Table III.
θ b2 ;θ
g
2 NOP Access
NOP (r24 ,0);(r
2
4 ,r
2
4/2) (r
2
1(x
2),r24− r21);(r24 ,r24)
Monitor (r24− c2,0);(r24− c2,r24/2) (r2− c2,−r2);(r24− c2,r24)
TABLE III: The utility matrix (J21(θ1,θ2),J
2
2(θ1,θ2)) for P1,P2
under different types and states x2 ∈ {0,1,2,3}. The payoffs
are in red under type θb2 while in blue under θ
g
2 .
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents results and insights from the case
study. We focus on the SBNE of the final-stage game in
VI-A and the PBNE of the multistage game in VI-B.
A. Final Stage and SBNE
Players’ beliefs affect their policies and the expected
utility at the final stage. We discuss three different
scenarios as follows. In Fig 4, we plot both players’
strategies and utilities when the user knows that the
defender is of the primitive type, yet the primitive
defender only knows the probability of the user being
adversarial. In Fig. 5, we study the case where the
primitive defender knows that the user is adversarial
while the adversarial user only knows the probability
of the system being primitive. In Fig. 6, we show the
plots where both players’ types are private, and each
11
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Fig. 4: The SBNE strategy and the ex-
pected utility when the defender has one-
sided incomplete information.
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Fig. 5: The SBNE strategy and the ex-
pected utility when the user has one-sided
incomplete information.
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Fig. 6: The SBNE strategy and the
expected utility under double-sided in-
complete information.
player only knows the probability of the other player’s
type. In all three scenarios, the x-axis represents the
belief at state x2 = 3. In particular, the x-axis in Fig.
4 or 6 represents the percentage of attackers among all
users or equivalently, the probability of the user being
adversarial. Correspondingly, the x-axis in Fig. 5 can
represent either the percentage or the probability of the
sophisticated system.
Fig. 4 shows the following trends as the user becomes
more likely to be adversarial. First, two black lines
show that the expected utility of the system decreases
and the defender is more inclined to monitor after her
belief exceeds a threshold. Second, two red lines show
that the adversarial user takes action ‘NOP’ with a
higher probability and only gains a reward when the
percentage of adversarial users is sufficiently low. Thus,
we conclude that when the attack’s percentage increases,
the defender tends to invest more in cyber defense so
that the attacker behaves more conservatively and inflicts
fewer losses. Third, the two blue lines show that the
legitimate user always accesses the sensor and receives
a constant utility, which indicates that the proactive
defense does not affect the behavior and the utility of
legitimate users.
Fig. 5 shows that a system benefits from introducing
uncertainties. When the system becomes more likely to
be the sophisticated type θH1 , both types of systems can
have a higher probability not to monitor and save the
surveillance cost. The attacker with incomplete infor-
mation has a threshold policy and switches to a lower
attacking probability after reaching the threshold of 0.5
as shown in the black line. When the probability goes
beyond the threshold, the system of the primitive type
θL1 can pretend to be of the sophisticated type θ
H
1 and
take action ‘NOP’. Meanwhile, a system of type θH1 can
reduce the security effort and take action ‘NOP’ with
a higher probability since the attacker becomes more
cautious in taking adversarial actions after identifying the
system as more likely of type θH1 . It is also observed that
the system of type θH1 receives a higher payoff before
the attacker’s belief reaches the 0.5 threshold. After the
belief reaches the threshold, the attacker is threatened to
take less aggressive actions, and both types of systems
share the same payoff.
Finally, we consider the double-sided incomplete in-
formation where both players’ types are private infor-
mation, and each player only has the belief of the other
player’s type. Compared with the defender in Fig. 4 who
takes action ‘NOP’ with a probability less than 0.5 and
receives a decreasing expected payoff, the defender in
Fig. 6 can take ‘NOP’ with a probability closed to 1 and
receive a constant payoff in expectation after the user’s
belief exceeds the threshold. Thus, the defender can
spare defense efforts and mitigate risks by introducing
uncertainties on her type as a countermeasure to the
adversarial deception.
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Fig. 7: The utility of the primitive system and the attacker ver-
sus the value of r2L under different final states x
2 ∈ {0,1,2,3}.
1) Sensitivity Analysis: As shown in Fig. 7, if the
value of the penalty r2L is close to 0, i.e., the defense
at the final stage is ineffective, then an arrival at state
x2 = 3 and the highest privilege level can significantly
increase the attacker’s utility and cause the most damage
to the system. As more effective defensive methods are
employed at the final stage and the value of r2L increases,
the attacker becomes more conservative and strategic in
taking adversarial behaviors. Then, the state with the
highest privilege level may not be the most favorable
state for the attacker.
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Fig. 8: The defender’s prior and posterior
beliefs of the user being adversarial.
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x2.
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Fig. 10: The system utility under de-
ceived beliefs.
B. Multistage and PBNE
We show in Fig. 8 that the Bayesian belief update
leads to a more accurate estimate of users’ types. Without
the belief update, the posterior belief is the same as the
prior belief in red and is used as the baseline. As the prior
belief increases in the x-axis, the posterior belief after the
Bayesian update also increases in blue. The blue line is
in general above the red line, which means that with the
Bayesian update, the system’s belief becomes closer to
the right type. Also, we find that the belief update is the
most effective when an inaccurate prior belief is used as
it corrects the erroneous belief significantly.
In Fig. 9, we show that the proactive defense, i.e.,
defensive methods in intermediate stages can affect the
state transition and reduce the probability of attackers
reaching states that can result in huge damages at the
final stage. As the prior belief of the user being adver-
sarial increases, the attacker is more likely to arrive at
state x2 = 0 and x2 = 1, and reduce the probability of
visiting x2 = 2 and x2 = 3.
1) Adversarial and Defensive Deception: Fig. 10 in-
vestigates the adversarial deception where the attacker
takes full control of the system and manipulates the
defender’s belief. As shown in Fig. 10, the system
utilities all increase when the belief under the deception
approaches the correct belief that the user is adversarial.
Also, the increase is stair-wise, i.e., the defender only
alternates her policy when the manipulated belief is
beyond certain thresholds. Under the same manipulated
belief, a sophisticated defender θH1 benefits no less than
a primitive defender θL1 . The defender receives a higher
payoff when the attacker starts from the external state
x0 = 0 rather than the internal state x0 = 1.
Incapable of identifying the adversarial deception, the
defender can alternatively introduce defensive decep-
tions, e.g., a primitive defender can disguise itself as
a sophisticated one to confuse the attacker. Defensive
deceptions introduce uncertainties to attackers, increase
their costs, and increase the system utility. Fig. 11 in-
vestigates the system’s and attackers’ utilities under three
different scenarios. The complete information refers to
the scenario where both players know the other player’s
type. The deception with the H-type or the L-type
means that the attacker knows the defender’s type to
be θH1 or θ
L
1 , respectively, yet the defender has no
information about the user’s type. The double-sided
deception indicates that both players do not know the
other player’s type. The results from Fig. 11 are sum-
marized as follows. First, the defender’s payoffs under
type θH1 can increase as much as 56% than those under
type θL1 . Also, prevention of the attacker from entering
the internal network x0 = 1 increases the defender’s
utility by as much as 41% and reduces the attacker’s
utility by as much as 38%. Second, the defender and
the attacker receive the highest and the lowest payoff,
respectively, under the complete information. When the
attacker introduces deceptions over his type, the at-
tacker’s utility increases and the system utility decreases.
Third, when the defender adopts defensive deceptions to
introduce double-sided incomplete information, we find
that the decrease of system utilities is reduced by at
most 64%, i.e., the decrease of system utilities changes
from $55,570 to $35,570 under the internal state and
type θH1 . The double-sided incomplete information also
brings lower utilities to the attacker than the one-sided
adversarial deception. However, the system utility under
the double-sided deception is still less than the com-
plete information case, which concludes that acquiring
complete information of the adversarial user is the most
effective defense. However, if the complete information
cannot be obtained, the defender can mitigate her loss
by introducing defensive deceptions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are emerging
security challenges for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs)
as the attacker can stealthily enter, persistently stay in,
and strategically interact with the system. In this work,
we have developed a game-theoretic framework to design
proactive and cross-layer defenses for CPSs in a holistic
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manner. Dynamic games of incomplete information have
been used to capture the long-term interaction between
users and defenders who have private information un-
known to the other player. Each player forms a belief
on the unknowns and uses a Bayesian update to learn
the private information and reduce the uncertainties.
The analysis of the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(PBNE) has provided the defender with an effective
countermeasure against the stealthy strategic attacks at
multiple stages. To compute the PBNE of the dynamic
games, we have proposed a nested algorithm that it-
eratively alternates between the forward belief update
and the backward policy computation. The algorithm
has been shown to quickly converge to the ε-PBNE that
yields a consistent pair of beliefs and policies.
Using a Tennessee Eastman (TE) process as a case
study of industrial control systems, we have shown
that proactive multistage defenses in cyber networks
can successfully mitigate the risk of physical attacks
without reducing the payoffs of legitimate users. In
particular, experiment results show that a sophisticated
defender receives a payoff up to 56% higher than a
primitive defender does. Also, it has been illustrated
that by preventing the attacker from entering the in-
ternal network, the defender increases her utility and
reduces the attacker’s utility by at most 41% and 38%,
respectively. On one hand, the attacker receives a higher
payoff after introducing adversarial deceptions which
increase defender’s uncertainties. On the other hand, by
also creating uncertainties for attackers, the defender can
successfully threaten them to take more conservative
behaviors and also become less motivated to launch
attacks. It has been shown that the system significantly
benefits from mitigation of losses after the defender
adopts defensive deceptions.
The future work would extend the framework to an
N-person game to characterize the interactions among
different types of users and model composition attacks.
We would also consider the scheme where players’
actions and the system state are partially observable.
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